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THE PENSION ACCOUNTING MYTH 
Abstract: This paper traces the development of pension accounting theory and 
practice to 1930. It analyzes the early development of pension accounting theory 
and practice, examines explanations of the nature of pension costs, and reports 
the results of a survey of pre-1930 pension disclosure practices. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board's employer pension 
accounting project has been described as "one of the most im-
portant undertaken since the Board was established in 1973."1 
Analyses of the project follow a standard format of (1) describing 
the pension pronouncements of the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB), (2) discussing the pension reform legislation of the 1970s 
and 1980s, and (3) criticizing the FASB's proposals for change. 
Absent is any consideration of pension accounting theory and 
practices developed between the establishment of the first U.S. 
private, pension plan in 18752 and the 1966 Accounting Principles 
Board Opinion No. 8.3 This omission underscores the myth that 
pension accounting theory and practice did not begin to develop 
until the advent of pension regulation. 
To refute this myth, this paper reviews pension accounting theory 
and practice during the unregulated period prior to any pronounce-
ment by the Accounting Principles Board, the securities laws (1933, 
1934), the Social Security Act (1935), and much of the tax legis-
lation directed at private pension plans (1928 and thereafter). This 
approach eliminates, or at least minimizes, the effects of regulatory 
influences. 
The paper contains four sections each directed at one of the 
following questions: 
(1) What factors affected the early development of pension ac-
counting theory and practice? 
(2) What theories existed to guide measurement and disclosure? 
The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Maurice S. Newman, 
Paul Garner, and Rick Turpen. The research was supported by a grant from Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell and Company. 
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(3) What types of pension disclosures were made? 
(4) What can be learned from studying the historical development 
of pension accounting theory and practice? 
Factors Affecting The Development of Pension 
Accounting Theory and Practice 
The first formal, noncontributory pension plan was established in 
1875 by the American Express Company.4 Under the terms of the 
plan, employees sixty years of age or over who had worked con-
tinuously for the company for at least twenty years, and who were 
judged by the general manager to no longer be able to do their 
work, could be retired by the executive committee of the board of 
directors. The annual pension allowance was one-half of the em-
ployee's average annual pay during the 10 years preceding retire-
ment, to a maximum of $500. Average annual pay being $439 for 
manufacturing employees and $560 for railroad employees,5 most 
pensioners would have received less than $300 a year in benefits. 
The number of new pension plans grew relatively slowly during 
the next fifty years. In 1929, there were only 397 pension plans 
operated in the U.S. and Canada. The growth rate accelerated over 
the next decade, and by March 31, 1945 over 7,500 plans had been 
submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for advance rulings 
on their tax status.6 
The growth of the private pension system was caused by in-
dustrialization and changing demographics. Procedures to ac-
count for these plans were influenced by (1) the types of plans, (2) 
employer motives for establishing the plans, (3) managerial phi-
losophy, (4) financial considerations, and (5) legislation and 
judicial decisions. 
Types of Plans 
Early pension plans can be classified as informal or formal. 
In informal plans, there were no standards for granting benefits. 
Payments were made on the basis of the employer's assessment 
of need rather than using standardized criteria. Because of their 
lack of structure, there was rarely a written record of how these 
plans operated. Accordingly, it is difficult to determine the extent 
or importance of these plans. 
Formal plans have written (or unwritten but consistently followed) 
rules governing eligibility requirements, computation of benefits, 
and other procedures. Annual reports and labor records often 
provide insights into the operation of these plans. With formal plans 
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labor records usually show a steady rather than erratic pattern of 
employee retirements each year. 
Within the category of what are now called defined benefit plans, 
formal plans are broadly classified as noncontributory or con-
tributory. The former meant that the employee made no cash con-
tribution to the plan and the latter that he contributed regularly 
from his cash wages. 
Noncontributory plans were further distinguished as "dis-
cretionary" or "limited-contractual" plans. Employers sponsoring 
noncontributory "discretionary" plans had complete, unquestioned 
control over the general provisions of the plan, the amount of bene-
fits, the continuance of the plan, and the continuance of the pension 
once payments began. This type of plan has been described as 
saying to the worker: 
• If you remain with this company through your productive 
lifetime, 
• If you do not die before the retirement age, 
• If you are not discharged, or laid off for an extended 
period, 
• If you are not refused a benefit as a matter of discipline, 
• If the company continues in business, and 
• If the company does not decide to abandon this plan, 
• you will receive a pension at the age of , subject to 
the contingency of its discontinuance or reduction, after 
it has been entered upon.7 
With one exception, this description also applied to "limited-
contractual" plans. The exception was that under a "limited-con-
tractual" plan, pension payments to an employee could not be 
discontinued once they were begun. A 1922 study of eighty-seven 
noncontributory plans indicated that only twenty-seven were 
"limited-contractual" plans.8 
In the majority of noncontributory plans, computation of benefit 
payments was directly related to an employee's pay during the 
final years of his service to the employer.9 This type of plan, com-
monly called a final pay plan, is still prevalent today.10 
Motives and Managerial Philosophy 
The discretionary nature of early pension plans suggests that 
payments made under these plans may have been viewed as gifts 
or rewards. This conclusion is supported by early plan descrip-
tions which characterize pension payments as "voluntary gifts from 
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the company"11 but it is at odds with analyses of employers' 
motives for establishing pension plans. 
A 1922 critique of industrial pension plans lists five motives for 
establishing a plan. 
• A desire to provide for the old age dependent, super-
annuated employees. 
• A desire to reward employees who have rendered un-
usually long service. 
• A desire to increase efficiency, first by the elimination 
of superannuated or incapacitated workers on a humane 
basis and, second, by stimulating the good will and effort 
of the active force. 
• A desire to hold the worker to the job, thereby reducing 
labor turnover. 
• A desire to exercise a disciplinary control over workers 
in response to strikes and in other ways.12 
After lengthy discussion, the critique concludes that the "one 
controlling justification of a pension system from the employer's 
standpoint is that it will increase efficiency, primarily through eli-
mination of superannuated and incapacitated workers, and possibly 
by building up a larger amount of good will and interest among 
the active force."13 This conclusion is supported by the fact that 
formal pension plans developed most rapidly in industries (e.g., 
railroads, heavy manufacturing) in which older workers normally 
would not have the physical strength or agility to perform the 
physical tasks required by their jobs. 
Economic factors also were used to explain why the majority of 
employers established noncontributory rather than contributory 
plans. One critic provided the following analysis: 
If the dominating influence were the desire for a humane 
method of retirement, there would seem to be no reason 
against the employees contributing to a fund and having a 
voice in administration. That they do not do so leads to 
the conclusion that the railroads have preferred to bear the 
entire cost in order to retain full control of the schemes. 
This policy has the advantages, at least in the opinion of 
the management, of not complicating relations with trade 
unions, retaining full control of retirements and final judg-
ment on the fulfilling of qualifications, discouraging strikes, 
and permitting retirement for the good of the service and 
the public safety.14 
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The emphasis on economic efficiency indicated in the fore-
going quotes is consistent with a management philosophy of 
the early part of the twentieth century referred to as scientific 
management. Proponents of this philosophy looked at business 
organizations from a highly mechanistic view and saw workers as 
tools for achieving rational, profit-maximizing goals.15 
Although employers viewed pension plans as a means of im-
proving labor productivity, the general attitude of workers toward 
early pension plans was one of indifference or distrust. Labor leader 
Samuel Gompers described organized labor's position as follows: 
Labor does not believe in pensions given by the employer. 
Old age pensions were established by a number of railroad 
companies, not for the benefit of their employees primarily 
but for the influence they might have on discouraging or-
ganization. . . .16 
Labor's negative attitude toward pensions, which continued until 
the cash wage freezes of the 1940s, supports the contention that 
early pension plans were designed to meet the economic needs of 
the employer rather than those of the employees. 
Financial Considerations 
Concern for the financial health of industrial pension plans sur-
faced early. In 1922, for example, Conant stated, "very few of the 
industrial pension plans in the United States today are so financed 
that they are likely to remain solvent without refinancing or modifi-
cation."17 Latimer's study concluded, "the great majority of pen-
sion plans in American industry have been established with no 
accurate calculation of their future costs and with no adequate 
provision for financing them."18 
Factors cited as contributing to these problems included (1) 
absence of actuarial calculations of prospective payments, (2) 
failure to establish segregated pension funds, and (3) the use of 
salary-related benefit formulas. 
Legislation and Court Decisions 
Employers had almost total discretion in the administration of 
early pension plans. Initially, this discretion was not an issue of 
public policy. The early tax laws, for example, did not require 
nondiscrimination in the payment of benefits or irrevocability of 
contributions as conditions for the tax deductibility of pensions 
paid to retired employees or contributions to a trust to fund current 
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pension credits. They also did not permit the deduction of pay-
ments to a trust to fund credits for past service or to put the trust 
on a sound financial basis. The latter type of deduction was first 
permitted by the Revenue Act of 1928. 
The right of employers to unlimited discretion in plan adminis-
tration was supported by a series of court decisions. The main 
question adjudicated was whether the offer of a pension constituted 
an agreement to pay when specified conditions were fulfilled or 
whether it was merely an offer of a gratuity which could be with-
drawn by the employer at will. Since there was no statutory law 
on the subject, early court decisions represented the only source 
of authority on the contractual status of a pension arrangement. 
Latimer's analysis of major cases prior to 1930 concluded "the 
trend of the law so far has been to say to industry that it make its 
own law for pensions. The court will take the pension plan as the 
statute in each case and decide in accordance with it."19 This 
meant that the amount due was generally not deemed to be com-
pensation and the fullfillment by the employee of his part of the 
agreement was not regarded as the consideration necessary for 
completion of a contract. 
Implications for Accounting 
The factors reviewed in the preceding subsections have conflict-
ing implications for the development of pension accounting theory 
and practice. On the one hand, the emphasis on economic effi-
ciency, scientific management, and the financial health of pension 
plans provided incentives for the development of fairly detailed 
records to determine the cost of providing pension benefits. On 
the other hand, however, the emphasis on employer control of pen-
sion plans shown by managerial practices, court decisions, and tax 
laws would have militated against the development of relatively 
uniform and consistently applied accounting rules. 
The next two sections indicate how this conflict was resolved. 
The first examines the early pension-related accounting literature, 
and the second, the pension accounting practices that evolved. 
Development of Pension Accounting Theory 
Two theories were developed to explain who bears the cost of 
providing pension benefits. One, the deferred wage theory, argued 
that employees actually financed their own pensions by accepting 
pension promises in lieu of cash wages. The other contended that 
it was the employer who bore the entire cost of the plan. 
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The deferred wage theory is based on the premise that pension 
promises are part of the total compensation package offered em-
ployees. Since the total value of the compensation package is fixed 
by the market, an, increase in the pension component would be 
offset by a decrease in the cash wage. An early proponent of the 
deferred wage theory argued, "a pension system considered as part 
of the real wages of an employee is really paid by the employee, 
not perhaps in money, but in foregoing an increase in wages which 
he might obtain except for the establishment of a pension 
system."20 
The Illinois Pension Laws Commission reached a similar conclu-
sion. Their report noted, 
It is the opinion of students of the pension problem that 
the existence of a pension system in connection with any 
position of employment is taken into account by both 
parties to the contract of employment, and that broadly 
speaking, wages and salaries actually paid are in due 
course reduced below what they otherwise would be by 
the amount of the total contributions from both the em-
ployer and employee to a pension fund. The employee will 
thus pay for his pension by deductions from his wages 
or salary, whether he is conscious of it or not.21 
The competing theory refutes this position and argues that a 
pension contribution is similar to a charge for depreciation or in-
surance. A proponent of this view noted: 
in so far as such a payment is for insurance against that 
waste and inefficiency in his establishment which would 
result from retaining superannuated employees and for 
protection against that discontent which would result from 
discharging the superannuated without providing for them 
financially, it is part of the business expense.22 
A similar position to the latter was adopted in the first pension 
accounting article to appear in the Journal of Accountancy. To the 
author, pension plans were an operationalization of the philosophy 
of scientific management. Employers bore the additional cost of 
the plans because they expected them to help increase profit-
ability. However, the cost was not viewed as a production cost. 
Rather, it was viewed as a separate charge against income, or a 
form of profit-sharing. Appropriate accounting meant that "pensions 
should be provided for in a reserve, during the period of activity of 
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the employee, and, like Bonus and Profit-sharing, be treated as a 
regular expense of business."23 
Hatfield also advocated including among expenses "the amount 
necessary to provide for future pensions."24 In addition, he ques-
tioned whether employers with pension plans should recognize a 
balance sheet liability. He concluded that the answer depended on 
"the exact legal nature of the pension agreement and on the finan-
cial policy adopted in its administration."23 He argued that unless 
a definite legal liability existed, an amount equal to the sum in the 
pension fund, should be regarded as a reserve rather than a lia-
bility. 
Hatfield noted that if annual contributions were made to a trustee, 
neither assets nor a reserve needed to be shown on the balance 
sheet. He reasoned that in such cases the payment of wages con-
sisted of two parts: a cash wage paid to the workman and a cash 
contribution made to the trustees. According to Hatfield, no further 
accounting was necessary after the cash payments were recorded.26 
Like Rand and Hatfield, Whitmore recommended accrual ac-
counting for pensions. His recommendation was based on the 
premise that pension promises are part of the total cost of labor. 
In a 1927 Journal of Accountancy article, highly critical of industrial 
pensions, he argued, 
The real troubles are lack of actuarial calculations and of 
funding; or in plainer words, ignorance of the long-con-
tinued increase and the ultimate annual burden of pension 
payments, and neglect of the principle that the cost of 
pensions, as a part of the cost of labor, needs to be ac-
crued, year by year throughout the years in which labor 
is performed.27 
Whitmore intended for each year's cost accrual to be fully 
funded. He reasoned that to do otherwise would render the plan 
financially unsound and understate the cost of production. 
A subsequent article by Whitmore focused on the implications of 
the deferred wage theory of pensions. Whitmore argued that "it is 
fairly certain that what the workers receive as pensions they will 
not receive as wages. And there is this great difference, that wages 
are likely to be fairly distributed as earned, and pensions are not."28 
Whitmore thought that employers should raise cash wages to allow 
employees to provide for their own retirement rather than promis-
ing pension benefits. He concluded his arguments by predicting 
the eventual demise of industrial pensions: 
8
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 11 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol11/iss2/3
Stone: The Pension Accounting Myth 27 
[employee savings plans] would accomplish far more good 
than pension systems, at least in manufacturing industry, 
and be free from all of the evils affecting both employer 
and employees, that seem inseparable from pension sys-
tems. 
It is, therefore, through rising wages based upon ac-
counting measurements of economies in manufacturing, 
and through the maximum encouragement and scientific 
management of savings, . . ., that I believe the need for 
pension systems in manufacturing industry should gradu-
ally cease.29 
In contrast to Whitmore, Kimball supported the proposition that 
pensions are necessary to maintain efficiency in a continuously 
operating organization. He criticized the practice of charging pen-
sion payments to a supplementary payroll and treating them as a 
period operating cost. He argued pension cost was a production cost 
and that it was "logically inescapable that production cost is prop-
erly chargeable at the time goods or services entering into produc-
tion are used, and not at the time they are paid for."30 The amount of 
pension cost would be "the present worth of the future pension 
liability arising in any year out of that year's service."31 In other 
words, it would be an amount equal to the normal cost of an 
actuarial cost method that took into consideration factors such as 
mortality, turnover, and future salary levels. 
Although Kimball advocated annual pension accrual, he did not 
advocate the segregation of assets in a separate pension fund. He 
argued, "sound pension accounting and sound pension practice 
do not require the segregation of the money out of which pensions 
will eventually be paid, any more than the meeting of other obli-
gations requires the segregation of money for its liquidation."32 He 
reasoned that showing a balance sheet reserve was sufficient. 
Kimball attributed the lack of attention given to pension account-
ing by employers to the fact that pension plans are non-contractual. 
He supported this statement by noting that "many executives of 
important businesses, which have for years made regular disburse-
ments, have told me that since the pension was a voluntary matter, 
determined in amount and terms at the date of grant, future pension 
payments did not constitute an obligation that could properly be  
considered a balance-sheet item."33 Kimball acknowledged the tech-
nical accuracy of this position, but advocated reporting the pension 
reserve as a liability in the balance sheet. 
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Dicksee discussed the use of reserves in accounting.34 His dis-
cussion distinguished reserves and reserve funds. A reserve was 
"a provision charged against profit with a view to covering an ex-
pected loss."35 Although Dicksee used the term loss in his defi-
nition, his example of creating reserves for the estimated amount 
of uncollectible accounts suggests that his use of the term encom-
passes provisions for estimated expenses. Thus, the creation of a 
reserve involved a debit to an expense or loss account and a credit 
to a reserve account. 
Dicksee indicated that the reserve should be treated as a deduc-
tion from the particular asset in respect of which it was created or 
as a liability if created to cover a general loss (estimated expense) 
in respect to all assets. Although Dicksee did not specifically 
address the use of reserves in pension accounting, it appears as 
though a pension reserve would have been shown as a liability 
rather than a deduction from a specific account such as cash. 
In contrast to a reserve, a reserve fund was "a sum set aside out 
of divisible profits, and retained in hand for the purpose of strength-
ening the financial position of the undertaking."36 A Reserve Fund 
is but a portion of the credit balance of the Profit and Loss Account, 
which has been specifically "earmarked" as being "reserved."37 
Inclusion of a Pension Fund Reserve in the balance sheet indicated 
to shareholders that the fullfillment of pension promises would 
make a certain amount of earned surplus unavailable for the pay-
ment of dividends. In other words, it indicated there was an appro-
priation of retained earnings. 
A Survey of Pension Disclosures 
Pension accounting practices of employers prior to regulation 
have not been well documented. The fact that published articles 
argued how pensions should be accounted for suggests that prac-
ticing accountants may have been using a variety of approaches. 
To gain insights into the pension accounting and disclosure prac-
tices of employers, a sample of companies sponsoring pension 
plans in the early twentieth century was selected from a list of com-
panies starting pension plans before 1922.38 From this list, it was 
possible to locate sets of pre-1930 annual reports for the following 
companies: American Sugar Refining Company, American Smelting 
and Refining Company, J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company, 
Colorado Iron and Fuel Company, Deere and Company, Diamond 
Match Company, International Harvester, Pittsburgh Coal Company, 
and U.S. Steel. The annual report for each company for each year 
available was examined for pension disclosures. 
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Table 1 summarizes the results of the examination.* It indicates 
the types of disclosures the individual companies made. The 
majority of the companies studied tended to provide quantitative 
and relatively detailed qualitative pension disclosures. Only three 
of the companies (Colorado Fuel and Iron, J. I. Case Threshing 
Machine, and Diamond Match) did not provide disclosures that gave 
insights into the operation of their pension plans and the systems 
used to account for them. 
In some cases, the disclosures voluntarily made provided basic-
ally the same information that was later required by regulation. For 
example, the 1911 annual report of the American Sugar Refining 
Company included a three page description of the provisions of the 
company's newly adopted pension plan. The description indicated 
who would receive benefits, how they would be earned, and how 
the amounts of benefits would be computed. This type of informa-
tion, which also was disclosed voluntarily by American Smelting, 
International Harvester, and U.S. Steel, is what the federal govern-
ment now requires in summary plan descriptions filed with the De-
partment of Labor under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act. 
Although several companies discussed the computation of pen-
sion cost, it was frequently difficult to determine how the cost was 
computed. Rather than discussing cost in their narrative disclosures, 
the companies tended to focus on absolute amounts, e.g., how 
many employees were receiving benefits; how much did they re-
ceive during the current period and to date; and how much was 
appropriated for the plan. 
The majority of the companies used a reserve to account for 
their pension commitments. Figure 1 shows the pension reserve 
disclosures made by International Harvester in its 1918 annual 
report. A reconciliation of beginning and ending reserve balances 
was also provided in the annual reports of Pittsburgh Coal and 
U.S. Steel. 
Several variations of reserve accounting existed. Journal entries 
for two of the variations are shown in Figure 2. Under both, the 
amount initially credited to the reserve was likely to be determined 
without the use of actuarial calculations. The amount credited to the 
reserve each year, if any, often was determined by the profitability 
of the company during the year. The reserve may have been desig-
nated as relating only to pensioners or as relating to the active 
work force as well as pensioners. The practice of pension reserve 
*Copies of the detailed analyses of disclosures for each year are available 
from the author, 
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Table 1 
Some U.S. Pension Disclosure Practices Prior to Regulation 
TYPES OF DISCLOSURES 
American 
Sugar 
Refining 
Co. 
American 
Smelting & 
Refining Co. 
Deere & 
Co. 
Inter-
national 
Harvester 
Pittsburgh 
Coal Co. 
U.S. 
Steel 
Quantitative Disclosures 
• Pension investments 
as assets X X 
• Pension reserve on 
right hand side of 
balance sheet X X 
• Some measure of 
pension cost* X X 
• Detailed analysis of 
changes in reserve 
account included 
in financials 
Qualitative Disclosures 
• Employer's pension 
philosophy X X 
• Plan description X X 
• Discussion of plan 
changes X X 
• Number of pensioners X X 
* Measure generally is not 
the result of an actuarial 
cost method consistently 
applied—see discussion. 
accounting was followed by large companies, such as U.S. Steel, 
throughout the war years and into the 1950s. 
With variation 1 (Figure 2), the entry to create the reserves was 
simply a reclassification. In effect, it was an appropriation of earned 
surplus (i.e., retained earnings). According to Dicksee, the credit 
should have been to Pension Reserve Fund rather than Pension 
Reserve. However, the companies studied did not always make this 
distinction. A companion entry may or may not have been made to 
segregate cash in a special fund. If a fund was established, earn-
ings of the fund were used to pay pensioners. To the extent that 
fund earnings were insufficient to cover payments or if no fund 
existed, pension payments were recorded as a charge to operating 
expense. Debiting pension expense for the amount paid to pen-
12
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Figure 1 
1918 Pension Disclosures of International Harvester 
RESERVES 
Pension Fund: 
A permanent Pension Fund is established by annual appropriations from earnings, 
to be continued until its amount is sufficient to provide the income necessary for 
future payments. Pensions are paid by the Company without any contribution from 
employees. The appropriation made by the directors from 1918 earnings was 
$1,000,000, which has been invested in Liberty Bonds. 
On January 1, 1919, the pension plan rules were amended to conform more close-
ly to changed living conditions. The minimum pension was increased from $21 
per month to $30 per month. The maximum pension was increased from $100 per 
month to $208.33 per month, with the limitation that in no case shall a pension 
exceed one-half of the average annual pay. The Pension Board was authorized 
to increase the rate of monthly payment to pensioned employees from 1% to 
of the average annual pay for each year of active service; also to make 
the basis of calculating the average annual pay the consecutive ten year period 
in which the employee received the highest pay, instead of the last ten years of 
service, as heretofore. These changes will materially increase the total annual 
pension distribution. At December 31, 1918, there were 365 former employees on 
the pension roll. 
Balance at December 31, 1917: 
International Harvester Co. of New Jersey $2,336,762.94 
International Harvester Corporation 856,092.57 
$3,192,855.51 
Add: 
Income from Fund for year 1918 157,107.49 
Appropriation from 1918 Earnings 1,000,000.00 
$4,349,963.00 
Deduct: 
Pension payments during 1918 112,572.00 
Balance at December 31, 1918 $4,237,391.00 
Source: International Harvester Company, 1918 Annual Report, p. 13. 
sioners was referred to as pay-as-you-go accounting, a practice 
followed almost exclusively by railroads. 
In unprofitable years, the company could use cash from the 
pension fund (if one existed) and reclassify the pension fund re-
serve as earned surplus. As long as the pension fund and pension 
fund reserve existed, they were normally reported on the balance 
sheet. The fund was reported as an asset while the reserve was 
carried in a separate section usually as a segregation of earned 
surplus. Figure 3 shows the 1917 balance sheet disclosures of the 
American Sugar Refining Company. 
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Figure 2 
Journal Entries for Reserve Pension Accounting 
Entry 
To establish 
or increase 
the pension 
reserve 
To purchase 
investments, 
if plan funded 
To record 
investment 
earnings 
To record 
payments 
to pensioners 
Variation 1 
Earned Surplus XX 
Pension Reserve 
Fund XX 
Investments, 
Pension Fund XX 
Cash XX 
Cash XX 
Pension Reserve 
Fund XX 
Pension Reserve 
Fund XX 
Current Operating 
Expense XX 
Cash XX 
Variation 2 
Pension Reserve 
Expense XX 
Pension Reserve XX 
Investments, Pension 
Fund XX 
Cash XX 
Cash XX 
Pension Reserve XX 
Pension Reserve XX 
Cash XX 
With variation 2 (Figure 2) pension expense was charged each 
time the reserve was increased. If the increase was related to the 
assumed cost of pensions earned during the year, the employer 
was accruing pension costs. If an increase was made only in profit-
able years, however, the concept of accrual accounting was vio-
lated and the reserve served as a means of smoothing income. 
Under this variation, pension payments generally were charged to 
the reserve rather than expense. The pension fund, if any, was re-
ported as a balance sheet asset and the reserve was included with 
long-term liabilities, frequently as part of an amount captioned 
general reserves. 
A number of companies provided detailed analyses of their pen-
sion funds until around 1928. Figure 4 shows a pension fund state-
ment from the 1922 annual report of Pittsburgh Coal Company. 
The fund statement agreed with the company's financial statements. 
The $216,004.98, indicated by (1), was carried as a noncurrent 
asset on the balance sheet. The $215,301.77, indicated by (2), was 
shown as a gross receipts deduction in the profit and loss state-
ment. 
In 1928 pension funds and reserves began to move off the 
balance sheet. The prime factor associated with this movement was 
the Revenue Act of 1928. This act permitted an employer to take 
deductions for reasonable amounts paid in to a qualified trust in 
excess of the amounts required to fund current liabilities. This 
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Figure 3 
1917 Balance Sheet of The American Sugar Refining 
Company and Its Constituent Companies 
The American Sugar Refining Company 
and Its Constituent Companies 
Condensed General Balance Sheet, December 31, 1917 
ASSETS: 
Real Estate and Plants, including Refineries, Warehouses, Coop-
erage, Railroads, Tank Cars, Wharves and Stables, with their 
machinery and equipment, and timber and other lands owned 
in fee or through ownership of the entire Capital Stock of con-
stituent companies, at cost less depreciation $45,931,123.93 
investments, General 24,782,540.68 
Investments, Insurance Fund 9,500,000.00 
Investments, Pension Fund 1,750,000.00 
Merchandise and Supplies, including raw and refined sugar, 
syrup, material in process of manufacturing, boneblack, coop-
erage and other stock and supplies on hand 9,142,074.71 
Prepaid Accounts, Insurance, Taxes, Etc 309,051.18 
Loans 1,121,266.10 
Accounts Receivable 3,322,489.23 
Accrued Income, Interest earned and dividends declared but not 
yet collected 1,047,043.91 
Cash on hand, with Trust Companies, Banks and Short-term 
Loans 40,493,252.19 
$137,398,841.93 
Capital Stock: 
Preferred $45,000,000.00 
Common 45,000,000.00 $90,000,000.00 
Sundry Reserves: 
For Insurance $9,500,000.00 
For Pension Fund 1,750,000.00 
For Improvement of Plants 3,367,514.84 
For Trade Mark Advertising 2,000,000.00 
For Contingencies 823,647.99 
17,441,162.83 
Accounts, Taxes and Loans Payable 8,097,115.45 
Dividends declared payable January 2, 1918, and former divi-
dends unclaimed 1,599,036.75 
Surplus: 
Balance December 31, 1916 $18,348,711.69 
Add Amount transferred in 1917 as stated in In-
come and Profit and Loss Statement 1,912,815.21 20,261,526.90 
$137,398,841.93 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
1917 Balance Sheet of The American Sugar Refining 
Company and Its Constituent Companies 
The American Sugar Refining Company 
and Its Constituent Companies 
Income and Profit and Loss Statement for the Year 1917 
CREDITS: 
Profit from Operations $10,055,291.41 
Interest on Loans and Deposits 1,006,002.25 
Income from Investments, less Decrease in Market Value of 
Bonds, and of Securities held for temporary investment 3,129,948.70 
Net Profit from Investments 21,544.85 
$14,212,787.21 
DEBITS: 
For Depreciation, Renewal or Replacement of 
Plant and Equipment $2,000,000.00 
For Appropriations to Reserves as follows: 
Insurance Fund $500,000.00 
Improvement of Plants 2,000,000.00 
Trade Mark Advertising 1,000,000.00 
Pension Fund 500,000.00 
4,000,000.00 
For Dividends declared during 1917 6,299,972.00 12,299,972.00 
Balance added to Surplus $1,912,815.21 
We have examined the books and accounts of The American Sugar Refining 
Company and the statements of the several constituent companies, and verified 
the cash, the loans and the securities owned. The foregoing Condensed Gen-
eral Balance Sheet and Income and Profit and Loss Statement agree with the said 
books and accounts. We are of the opinion that ample reserves have been made 
for depreciation or for renewal and replacement of fixed assets and for other pur-
poses, including taxes; that the value of the investments, as a whole, is conserva-
tively stated and the foregoing Condensed General Balance Sheet presents the 
true financial position of the corporation and its constituent companies on De-
cember 31, 1917. 
GEO. H. CHURCH, C.P.A., Auditors 
DELOITTE, PLENDER, GRIFFITHS & CO., 
New York, February 11, 1918 
Source: The American Sugar Refining Company, 1917 Annual Report, pp. 22-23. 
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Figure 4 
Detailed Pension Disclosures from the 
1922 Annual Report of Pittsburgh Coal Company 
MINE EMPLOYEES' PENSION FUND 
Cash on Hand at January 1, 1922 $ 8,348.54 
RECEIPTS 
Company and Employees Contributions $ 6,217.92 
Interest and Dividends from Investments 18,525.33 
24,743.25 (3) 
DISBURSEMENTS 
Pensions Paid 33,795.00 
Decrease during year 9,051.75 
Less—Advance from Employees' Relief 
Department 703.21 
8,348.54 
Cash Balance at December 31, 1922 
INVESTMENTS AT DECEMBER 31, 1922 
3000 Shares Preferred Stock of the Company—cost $211,004.98 
4¼% United States Liberty Loan Bonds— 5,000.00 
$216,004.98 (1) 
Less—Advance by Mine Employees' Relief 
Department 703.21 
Balance at Credit, December 31, 1922 (2) $215,301.77 
NUMBER OF MINE EMPLOYEES RECEIVING PENSIONS 
At January 1, 1922 166 
Added during year 37 
Deaths during year 18 19 
At December 31, 1922 185 
Source: Pittsburgh Coal Company, 1922 Annual Report, p. 22. 
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meant that, for the first time, employers were able to take deduc-
tions for payments to fund past service liabilities. The employers 
in the current study responded to this incentive by transferring 
their balance sheet reserves to a trust. 
The following explanation was provided in the 1928 annual report 
of International Harvester. 
On December 13, 1928, the directors approved the trustee-
ing of the Pension Fund and before the issuance of this 
report a Pension Trust was executed and Fund assets 
transferred to trustees. Accordingly, the Pension Fund and 
the contra reserve have been omitted from the balance 
sheet. 
The heavy future obligation involved in the maintenance of 
a pension plan can be safely financed only by setting 
aside during the employee's productive years the fund 
to pay his pension after retirement. The Company follows 
this plan and the Pension Fund assets now trusteed are re-
quired to meet the estimated accrued pension liability at 
December 31, 1928. It is expected that such additional 
amounts as the directors may hereafter appropriate 
for pension purposes will also be transferred to the Pen-
sion Trust. 
Establishment of a trust allowed an employer to take advantage 
of tax incentives, but the then current laws did not require that 
the trust be irrevocable. This meant that an employer could make 
substantial tax deductible contributions to a trust during years of 
high earnings and recapture the earnings in poor years by re-
voking the trust. The requirement that pension trusts be irrevo-
cable did not become law until the Revenue Act of 1938. Nonethe-
less, the establishment of trusteed plans was associated with a de-
crease in voluntary pension disclosures. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper refutes the myth that pension accounting theory and 
practice developed after the advent of regulation. By 1930, com-
peting pension theories had been articulated and a body of pension 
accounting literature had begun to develop. The literature focused 
on the importance of the accrual of pension costs, a practice that 
was not mandated by the Accounting Principles Board until 1966. 
The early literature also raised the question of whether an em-
ployer's pension promises constituted an obligation' that warranted 
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balance sheet recognition, a question currently being debated by 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
Although early writers devoted little attention to the question of 
pension disclosures, a survey of pre-1930 annual reports showed 
that some of the companies studied made extensive pension dis-
closures. Before there was any external requirement to do so, em-
ployers disclosed relatively detailed information about the terms 
of their plans and the reserves accumulated for those plans. 
Although measures of pension costs were disclosed, explanations 
of their method of computation often were missing, or ambiguous. 
Documentation of the existence of voluntary pension disclosures 
opens the door to a number of questions of potential interest to 
academic researchers and policy-makers. It may be useful to 
determine the motives for voluntary pension disclosure, and how 
these motives were affected by regulation. 
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